A day chasing death in Juárez: But how dangerous is it, really?

An essay: A day chasing death in Juárez: But how dangerous is it, really?

Unless you have been living under a rock lately, you’ve probably heard that Cd. Juárez is the most dangerous city in North America. So just how dangerous is it? Our sister city is in the midst of a long and arduous war of willpower between citizens who still believe in their city and criminals who want to wrest control away from the community in order to ply their deadly concoction in an attempt to mask life’s everyday problems for those who are too lazy to deal with life head on. And regardless of what you may think the solution to the problem is, you are likely to agree that Juárez is not a safe city. But really, how dangerous is Juárez?

If you were to judge Juárez by the mass media reports you would probably think that anyone going to our sister city is just plain crazy, some would even say, certifiable. Being a Mexican national and having spent the majority of my life on both sides of the border, I am as comfortable in the US as I am in Mexico. Because of my ability to interact seamlessly on both sides of the border my view may be a little more optimistic than others. Nonetheless, my answer to anyone contemplating going to Juárez, whether for business or recreation is that Juárez is safe as long as you don’t go looking for trouble. That said, I admit I went looking for trouble and guess what? I survived.

Recently, I spent the day in Juárez not tending to business or enjoying the city’s attractions but rather chasing down murder scenes and interviewing obvious targets of the drug wars. We were a motley crew of three men and two women in two vehicles, one with Texas plates and the other with Juárez plates. The group was comprised of a female TV producer out of Austin, a high-profile female television journalist from an English-speaking country from another continent, a camera crew based out of Juárez, and me, a tag along. I’ve decided to omit everyone’s names in order to protect the two cameramen who spend their days covering the gruesome murders day in and day out. It is not my place to make their jobs any more difficult than it already is.

We started out at about 10:30 in the morning by crossing the border into Juárez and meeting up with the camera crew. Immediately we headed to what could be called the epicenter of the drug wars: the Juárez General Hospital. Soon enough I realized the contrast between scandalous exaggeration and reality. We arrived at the hospital and as the crew went about their business of interviewing the person in charge, I got the benefit of interacting with everyday people and soldiers while observing what was happening in the city.

My first observation was that of a city aware of its vulnerability but not in a state of panic. Children and families went about their normal lives, walking on the streets and chatting among themselves. The soldiers were there but they were in their truck relaxing, while two manned the entrance to the ER. My first thought was, this is supposedly a city under siege so I am sure the soldiers were on high alert suspiciously checking everyone as they approached the hospital. The reality?

The two soldiers manning the check point were leisurely taking turns walking across the street to buy a burrito from the street vendor to tide them over. Approaching them, they looked up at me and said “Buenos días señor” along with a friendly wave. After spending a few moments of small talk, I asked them what they thought about what was going on. They told me that they had been mobilized as part of the war on drugs and that they missed their families, but that for the most part they liked the city. Interestingly they had very little information about the outside world and were hungrily quizzing me about what I knew about their deployment, especially after I told them that I worked on online projects.

Both felt that I probably had a wealth of information by having access to such a diverse source of information. After sharing what little I knew with them, I asked if they were apprehensive to which they replied that they were confident in their ability to defend themselves. I then asked if it was okay for me to take their pictures and both respectfully declined stating; “we can’t tell you not to but we would rather you didn’t”. Out of respect I did not take their pictures and excused myself.

My next conversation was with two female nurses buying tacos from the corner lunch wagon. I asked if they were afraid and both responded that they were from the city and that although they were not afraid they were more careful about their surroundings. Then, I was approached by an older neatly dressed gentleman who made small talk with me for a few minutes. He soon left but unbeknown to me he was to make another appearance later in the day.

The news crew completed their interview and we got in our vehicles in anticipation of heading to the next item on our itinerary. But our plans were interrupted when we got the first call of the day, a body had been found - were we interested? Of course the news crew was interested and we raced to the scene. We arrived about five minutes after the murder had been committed. A twenty-one year-old had been killed in what was going to be a bloody Tuesday.

His body lay where it had fallen. Soldiers secured the scene along with federal police while the state investigators began to collect evidence. A small group of people gathered to watch what was going on. As the news crew went about their business, I took the opportunity to take a few pictures of the scene and talk to the civilians gathered around. I asked the federal police and soldiers about their views and experiences. Everyone was willing to talk and share their points of view.

The federal police had arrived in February and were expecting to rotate to another city soon. Their job was to train, observe and support the newly-deployed Juárez police force. The soldiers, on the other hand were a combination of newly-arrived and those who had been at the city for at least three months and who were getting ready to redeploy soon. All were extremely polite to us and to the citizens with all requests or interactions preceded with a friendly hello. Not once was a weapon raised in a menacing way or was someone given gruff instructions. Like the other security personnel at the hospital, these law enforcement professionals were also hungry for information about what was happening in the city. It was obvious that there was a lack of reliable information about the on goings in the city for both the security units and the civilians in Juárez. Although not directly expressed by those I talked to, I got the impression that the lack of information among the troops was a decision from their command. For what purpose, I can only speculate.

I learned many interesting things from talking to these men. There are three distinct units - the military, the federal police and the state and municipal forces. Of the three, the military is in charge of security. They are divided into two groups: the “hunters” and the personnel that support the police units. The “hunters”, who wear the dark masks, are the ones that normally arrive at the scene first. Their job is to pursue, intercept and capture the criminals committing the crimes. The second group of soldiers is the military police. Their job is to help secure the scene and maintain a heavily-armed perimeter in case the perpetrators decide to come back to finish the job. The federal police units assist the local units with security and investigation. The local police are ultimately tasked with gathering evidence and documenting the crime scene. But, although unconfirmed to me, I observed the military conducting their own investigation, but for what purpose I could only guess as they were not as forth coming to my queries about this as they were to my other questions. My guess is that it was a military intelligence unit gathering intelligence or a unit shadowing the local police in their investigation.

I also soon realized that the military was not the only group doing their own intelligence gathering. It wasn’t apparent at first, but it became obvious as the day went on. And then there he was again, the older gentlemen that had approached me earlier at the hospital was at this crime scene just minutes after we had arrived, and we had been given the lead by someone with knowledge of the operations in Juárez. I wondered if this man had also gotten his own tip. Coincidence or not, he soon approached me. “Do you want to interview the wife of the friend who was with the victim at the time of the shooting?” he asked me. Apparently, the victim had been walking with his friend when the shooting occurred. The friend was not hurt but obviously shaken by the events that had transpired. The police were interviewing him. I asked the reporter if she wanted to interview the wife and of course she said yes. It turns out that the victim had gotten out of drug rehabilitation the night before and was returning home from job-hunting when he was shot. When asked how she felt about the violence, the wife responded that there was “too much” violence and that it wasn’t “fair that they killed the victim because he had just recently turned to God”.

As for the gentleman who facilitated this interview, I surmised that he was some type of “fixer”, someone facilitating communications between the diverse groups of interests congregating at the crime scenes; from the news media, to the security people, to the criminal elements, he seemed to be the “go-to” person. Not once did he ask for or insinuate that we had to “pay” for his service nor did we offer. So that got me thinking, what’s in it for him? Since I wasn’t sure what his motive was, I decided to ask the others what they thought rather than ask him directly. The Mexican cameramen agreed that he was some type of unofficial conduit but weren’t sure why and for whom. And, they weren’t interested in becoming too inquisitive. Of course I had to ask, were they afraid? Both of their answers were to the point, no but they recognized that they needed to be careful.

It turns out that the media at the crime scenes aren’t normally targeted unless they are disrespectful of the dead. They told me, the body is most likely a criminal but it is someone’s father, brother or husband. There is always someone watching that you don’t get too close to the body to take pictures that are disrespectful to someone else. That’s when I realized that the military wasn’t the only one running an intelligence operation. At all three crime scenes there was someone that was just out of place. At the first scene there was a middle-aged, heavily tattooed man and at the second one there was another younger man, a heavily tattooed individual with a backpack. Finally at the last crime scene there were groups of individuals that could easily have been observing for others but it was hard to tell as this last scene had five young man shot to death in front of a house and the crowds were much larger.

On the way to the next interview we once again received a call of another shooting; coincidently it was on the way to our next stop. Of course the news crew was more than interested and we arrived less than 3 minutes after the shooting had occurred. This time it was a Jeep Cherokee with three bodies in it. It had been shot at by a dark colored SUV. Once again we were treated respectfully and extended all courtesies. Soon, the news crew was able to complete the second interview of the day, and once again we got the call of another murder. This time we arrived about an hour and half after the crime had been committed. At this latest crime scene there were five bodies of young men in a low-income neighborhood. I asked one of the federal officers if this was drug related and he replied, “They say no, but look at how poor the neighborhood is and look at the car in the drive way”. It was a new model VW Beetle. Later it would turn out that the vehicle had been reported stolen earlier in the day. Again, the story was that the young men were returning home from a day of job hunting according to the witnesses and family members.

We went searching for insight into the violence in Juárez and we what we found was nine bodies at three crime scenes. There were twelve murders that day. Some would say we went looking for trouble and we found it. But, were we in danger? More to the point is Juárez dangerous or not? I tend to think that the American news media exaggerates in order to sell their news reports to the public. But at the same time I can’t deny that it is uncommon to be at two crime scenes with multiple bodies literally minutes after the victims were killed. The individuals with us, who live and work in Juárez, would have one point of view and no one likes to talk bad about their city. The two news professionals have their point of view based on their own experiences and bias. And I have my own point of view.

Of our motley crew I think the best answer to the question of Juárez’ safety comes from the foreign correspondent in our crew. Her response to my question about fear was; “I didn’t feel afraid the whole time we were in Juárez, rather I was a little apprehensive.”

My advice if you are planning on visiting Juárez? Check your fear at the border and use common sense.

Would I take a family member or friend to Juárez? Yes. Do I still go to Juárez? Yes. Am I afraid? No. But, I am aware of my surroundings.

There is an old saying in Spanish; “Dime con quién andas y te diré quién eres”. It loosely translates to; tell me who you hang out with and I’ll tell you who you are. I think this best describes your personal security in Juárez, or anywhere else for that matter. Hang out with drug dealers, addicts or other criminals and you are likely to get hurt. Keep to yourself and stay out of trouble and you are likely to be safe.

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A Cohesive U.S.-Mexico Drug Policy: Is Mexico embarking on Drug Legalization?

A Cohesive U.S.-Mexico Drug Policy: Is Mexico embarking on Drug Legalization?

Many in the U.S., especially the U.S. government, were mystified with Mexico’s recent decriminalization of small quantities of drugs for personal use. Some have even suggested that this shows that Mexico is seeking to legalize drugs in order to solve the pervasive drug problems the country faces both from a consumption and production standpoint. For those who can fully appreciate the differing points of view each country has, this recent action by Mexico makes perfect sense and does not signify a premise that legalizing drugs is the way to solve the drug issues.

Although we are neighbors and in many ways we share a common culture, we are nonetheless two different peoples approaching a shared problem from two very distinct perspectives. As tempting as it may be to think that Mexico is seriously considering legalizing drugs as a solution to the drug problem, this assumption ignores Mexico’s psyche when dealing with security issues. The differences in Mexican and U.S. points of view also make it highly unlikely that both countries would ever agree to a unified drug policy.

Two different points of view

In order to understand the drug policy of the Mexican government it is first important to understand how Mexicans interpret the world around them. Mexico and the U.S. started out as two different countries with two very different perspectives. The U.S. launched its independence as a spring board towards the future. Unlike Mexico, the United States has always seen itself as the leader in defining the way people should live and act across the nation and across the world. From its inception, the American psyche has been one of establishing a new norm of life, from politics to the economy.

Mexico, on the other hand, sees itself from a very different point of view. Mexicans, for the most part, identify themselves as a continuation of a long history of a conquered people. As Mexicans, we don’t see our independence from Spain as a new start, rather we see ourselves as having liberated ourselves from the Spanish conquest of our land. As soon as we liberated ourselves from Spain we were forced to defend ourselves again and again from other countries, including the United States, intent on annexing us. Octavio Paz defines this psyche as Mexican tradition and history being the center of the Mexican universe. America, on the other hand, he writes, sees its independence as a new beginning.

In short, we Mexicans see ourselves as a conquered people struggling to overcome our own sense of insecurity constantly wondering when the next shoe will fall. This is the underlining Mexican psyche and the one that governs our foreign policy and the use of our military.

Mexican foreign policy

U.S. and Mexican foreign policy can best be described as polar opposites. U.S. foreign policy is dictated by an outward world view while Mexican foreign policy can best be described as inward-looking. These two differing vantage points on how to deal with external and internal threats are the cornerstones as to why Mexico and the U.S. have such a differing point of view when dealing with transnational issues, especially security ones.

The nexus of U.S. foreign policy is Manifest Destiny and although it has gone through many historical alterations it nonetheless comes down to the notion that the country’s destiny is based on controlling the actions of other countries. The most recent example of this is George W. Bush’s “One Percent Doctrine”.
The Bush government’s One Percent Doctrine is based on the notion that to keep America safe it must act if there is at least a one-percent chance that a foreign country or entity has the capability to hurt the United States. Under this doctrine, the United States has the right to militarily and/or economically intervene to neutralize that threat whether it has been proven or not. In other words, if the American state perceives that a group, either governmental or non-governmental has the “one-percent” probability of hurting the United States than the government has the right and, some would argue, the obligation to destroy that threat with or without the world’s consent.

On the other hand, Mexico’s foreign policy is dictated by the Estrada Doctrine. The Estrada Doctrine has been the basis of Mexico’s foreign policy since the 1930’s. The Estrada Doctrine is based on the notion that each country has the right to self-determination based on the needs and wants of its people rather than the needs or wants of other countries. Under the Estrada Doctrine no country has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.

These two opposing views are the basis for the appearance of differing policies on the drug war. From the 1970’s through the 1990’s, Mexico’s response to the threat of the drug cartels was based on two important factors. The first was that the threat of drug use within Mexico was small or nonexistent. Coupled with limited governmental resources, Mexico saw the drug problem as an issue which the United States needed to deal with internally, not in Mexico. It was not until 1988 that the Mexican government begins to acknowledge that the drug cartels are a threat to Mexican national security. Outgoing president Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado declared drug trafficking as a threat to national security. This was affirmed by incoming President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and subsequent presidents. Initially, this action did little to enhance Mexico’s active participation in drug interdiction and was limited for the most part to drug eradication programs. Nonetheless, it set the legal framework from which Mexico would respond to the threat going forward.

Mexico initially saw the problem as a small external threat to the Mexican state and one that from Mexico’s point of view needed to be addressed by the U.S. within its borders not in Mexico. As such, Mexico’s solution to the problem was very Mexican and perplexing to the Americans. More importantly, the limited deployment of Mexican security forces further perplexed the U.S. because it seemed inadequate for the perceived threat. Understanding the limited resources Mexico has for its security forces and the limits imposed upon the military by history, governmental policy and institutions brings the Mexican action into clarity.

Military differences

Unlike the U.S. military which has the technology and resources to project policy beyond its borders, the Mexican military is governed by strong restrictions imposed on it by the realities of its geographic borders, its governing Constitutional limits, and the fact that Mexico borders the largest economy in the world.

Three primary doctrines govern Mexico’s military. They are DN-I, DN-II and DN-III. (DN stands for Defensa Nacional, or National Defense). Because of history and national policy, the Mexican military is severely limited in taking unilateral action and the government is limited in its ability to use it to enforce policy beyond its borders. DN-I and DN-II are defined as protecting the sovereignty of Mexico’s borders from external and internal threats respectively. DN-III ensures the use of the Mexican military for national relief efforts such as earthquake recovery response and is where the military was most active prior to President Calderon’s use of it against the cartels.

What changed?

Although past presidents have declared drug traffickers a threat to national security, the Mexican government had given the military limited authority to engage the cartels because of limited resources and the notion that the drug problem should be dealt with by the countries suffering from its effects and not by the country used as a transit point. Two things happened that forced the Calderon government to refocus the military’s engagement. First was the September 11 bombings of the Twin Towers which effectively (and unintentionally) made the crossing of drugs into the United States much more difficult. The second was Colombia’s mostly effective drug interdiction program that transformed Mexican cartels from subservient transporters of the illicit material to equal and active competitors for the immensely lucrative drug trade.

To the Mexican government, this turned the Mexican drug cartels from a passive perceived danger to a clear and present danger for two reasons: one being an economic one and the other a social one. With billions of dollars suddenly engorging drug cartel coffers, the drug organizations’ ability to destabilize the central government became a serious reality. This, coupled with the prospect that Mexican citizens, especially children, would eventually become active consumers of the drug trade and not simply casual observers, gave the government all the support it needed from the Mexican citizenry.

However, this created a problem for the Mexican government. Mexico’s funding of its military has traditionally been tempered with the realities of its national security. Mexico has no immediate threats bordering its national boundaries. To the south lies Guatemala and Belize. Although Guatemala and Mexico have had a tumultuous international relationship, for the most part Guatemala does not have the military capacity to violate Mexican sovereignty over an extended period of time. The last major diplomatic trouble between the two countries was the strafing of Mexican fishing boats by the Guatemalan Air Force in 1958. That event was settled with a Guatemalan apology within a few days. Belize and Mexico, on the other hand, have generally enjoyed a friendly relationship and therefore Belize posed no perceivable threat.

To the north, Mexico shares a border with the United States. The U.S./Mexico relationship at the governmental level can best be described as an uneasy friendship based on geographic and economic necessities rather than true friendship, although from a population level most Mexicans see Americans as friends and neighbors. The inter-governmental relationship is based on the country’s psyche and doctrines previously discussed as well as the six unprovoked military interventions in Mexico by the U.S. military (for a complete list, visit: http://www.martinparedes.com/GuerrasMexicanas). Because Mexico accepts that it cannot militarily compete with the United States and sees no immediate threat to its sovereignty from the south, the Mexican government has focused itself on arming the military in support of DN-II’s goal of protecting internal security, rather than on external threats.

Meanwhile, the ongoing terrorist threat to the U.S. has forced Mexico to reevaluate this notion of its ability to defend against an external threat. This is not because Mexico feels directly threatened by terrorist action, but rather because based on Mexico’s close economic ties to the United States any threat to the steady flow of Mexican oil to its northern neighbor amounts to an economic threat to the U.S. economy itself. And it is this potential threat to Mexican oil production that makes Mexico a target for anyone attempting to destabilize the United States.

Key among these is the Campeche oil fields. The Cantarell Complex is the second most productive oil field in the world. Disrupting this petroleum operation would have serious repercussions for the world economy not to mention the U.S. economy. Because of its vulnerability to aerial attack, Mexico has been forced to reevaluate its military’s force projection capability. Although the Mexican navy has recently undergone a re-modernization program designed to protect against surface threats, the Mexican air force is limited by both equipment and personnel in its ability to effectively counter a multiple terrorist air strike against the oil fields. Mexico’s air force is heavy on counterinsurgency (COIN) tools for internal security and relies on a small fleet of eight, Northrop F5e, and two F5f Tiger II’s for national air defense.

The supersonic F5’s, although capable of mounting a credible air interdiction mission, are limited by their age. They were deployed twenty-seven years ago and are based on 1970’s technology. Their limited numbers restricts their ability to answer a threat by simultaneous multiple attacks. Also, because of limited resources and diminished upward-mobility for its pilots, the FAM (Fuerza Aérea Mexicana or Mexican Air Force) has recently experienced a difficult time providing effective aircrews for its air force fleet. This has put Mexico in a difficult quandary: either recruit the U.S. to protect its oil fields or upgrade its own air defense capability.

The ongoing difficult world economy, combined with the political and economic stress of the war on drugs and the realities of this external threat, is essentially forcing Mexico to choose between spending limited resources in upgrading its military capacity or bringing U.S./Mexico military ties much closer than they are currently. The Mexican military has traditionally viewed the U.S. military with a mix of envy for its seemingly unlimited access to advanced weapon systems and distrust based on their differing missions and past unprovoked military interventions. At the same time the Mexican population, and by default the government, is distrustful of publicly giving U.S. military access to Mexican sovereignty duties either directly or indirectly.

Since World War II the U.S. has sought closer ties with the Mexican military going as far as suggesting the engagement of a hemispheric defense posture between Canada, Mexico and the U.S. Mexico has resisted these efforts because of the previously discussed reasons of doctrine and distrust. Mexico, nonetheless, simply cannot afford to unilaterally spend the necessary funds to upgrade its internal security mechanisms and, more importantly, its external defense posture without U.S. help. Deploying a new weapon system, such as interceptor aircraft, is not a simple thing of buying new aircraft. It requires a substantial investment in infrastructure such as airport facilities, air and support crew training, spare parts and munitions. Countries cannot simply buy aircraft without first investing in the necessary personnel training, parts and airport facilities to deploy them from.

At the same time, publicly acknowledging that the United States will defend Mexican national sovereignty would not only be destructive to the government but would be detrimental to U.S. interests as the Mexican population would likely rebel against such an initiative when made public. However, because of the American One Percent Doctrine it would be naïve not to assume that the United States is actively prepared to intervene should the need arise to protect Mexican oil fields but it is in neither countries’ interest to publicly acknowledge such a possibility. At the same time, for self-preservation purposes, Mexico must seem capable of protecting its own oil fields on its own whether it is a reality or not. How to solve the quagmire?

The Merida Initiative

The Merida Initiative is the opportunity for both countries to address their own foreign policy problems without “stepping” on each other toes and is most likely being used for such a purpose. For the U.S., drug interdiction at the source has been a matter of policy since the Nixon administration. The U.S. doctrine of dealing with the drug problem within Mexico has been stymied by Mexico’s reluctance to submit to a Columbia- or Peru-type plan that would allow U.S. military personnel to operate within its borders. Mexico, on the other hand, has had to face the reality that its foreign policy of allowing countries to solve their own problems may not be as easy now that the global economy has forced upon Mexico the need to proactively defend its national interests abroad. This does not mean that Mexico is ready or even willing to dramatically change its “inward” looking doctrine but it nonetheless has to prepare itself to deal with new threats to national sovereignty for national sake.

The Merida Initiative has given both countries an opportunity to coincide their diverse international policies without seeming to give in to each other’s diverse points of views. The Merida Initiative allows the United States the ability to effectively wage war in Mexico by addressing the drug problem for the United States on Mexican soil rather than on American soil, while simultaneously allowing Mexico the ability to address its own weapons needs.

For Mexico, the Merida Initiative addresses many issues at once. The first is upgrading the Mexican military capability on America’s dime. This “upgrade” is accomplished under Mexico’s inward looking requirement while at the same time allowing its policy of self-determination to remain intact. It also allows the Calderon administration to effectively deal with the national threat of the drug cartels all while seemingly maintaining the U.S. at an arm’s length. Thus, both countries get to keep their national doctrines intact while at the same time dealing with the hemispheric threat of the cartels. So does this signify a cohesive drug policy for both countries?

Although it may be tempting to think so, the reality is that both countries still look at the cartel problem from two distinct points of view. They each approach the problem with very individual solutions. For Mexico, the drug cartels are a national security threat because of the economic power they wield and, to a much lesser degree, because of their potential to create an entire generation of addicted individuals. For the U.S., the problem is one that needs to be controlled outside its borders and the only way to do so is through action in other countries. Although the drug policy actions of both countries may seem cohesive, the reality is that they are not, they just seem like they are.

Mexico’s recent decriminalization of small quantities of personal use drugs was not about a change in national policy but rather it was an exercise in political gamesmanship. The reality is that using resources to jail and prosecute small time drug dealers distracts the nation from the true threat: the cartels. The confusion among U.S. officials is based on the lack of understanding of the Mexican psyche. For those wondering if Mexico is about to embark on a national debate about legalizing drugs as a serious government initiative, the probability is that it will not happen anytime soon. Not because Mexico wants to be subservient to American interests, but because it cannot appear to be weak under the threat of cartel domination of the state, whether it is a reality or not. The added plus to the Merida Initiative is that it allows Mexico the ability to strengthen its security apparatus by using America’s own foreign policy framework to pay for it.

It is a dangerous game both countries are playing but it is one born of necessity. Could it backfire? Yes. But Mexico has always played this game effectively with the United States. Because the underlying doctrines of both countries are not about to change, the notion that Mexico and the U.S. will mount a cohesive policy is not possible. Although it may seem that both countries have a cohesive drug policy, the fact remains that it is cohesive so long as the policy serves the needs of each country independently but will change at a moment’s whim just as Mexico recently proved with the decriminalization of small quantities of dope. This change, also, does not signify a plan by Mexico to begin studying the issue of legalization.

Note: This paper was originally published in the Newspaper Tree as "U.S., Mexico uneasy allies in the Drug Wars" on September 28, 2009.

Introducing the Xiuhcóatl FX-05, Serpiente de Fuego (Fire Serpent)

Introducing Mexico’s first indigenously designed and produced assault rifle, the FX-05 Xiuhcóatl.

I produced this website to showcase this highly praised weapon. http://www.xiuhcoatl.org or http://www.fx-05.org

Les presento el primer fusil de asalto diseñado y producido por México, el fusil Xiuhcóatl FX-05.

Elabore esta página para presentarles este proyecto muy Mexicano. http://www.xiuhcoatl.org o http://www.fx-05.org

What can be done about Juarez? - El Paso Inc. April 25, 2010 Special Report Article

Note: This article originally appeared on El Paso, Inc. publication in the April 25, 2010 edition, page 12A.

Juárez and major parts of Mexico are in a crisis, forcing many in our community to ask, what can be done? The answer is simple yet complicated.

It is simple because the bilateral actions taken by the United States and Mexico are the answer to the crisis. The difficult part is accepting this.

Although many in the U.S. and Mexico view each other with distrust, the reality is that the two countries are symbiotically dependent on each other. In order for both to prosper, we must embrace each other as partners.

Mexico’s engagement against the drug cartels has been ongoing since the early 1960s. Mexican military forces were first deployed in 1966, followed by other operations.

Because of constitutional limitations, these military operations were limited to search and eradicate missions, rather than direct engagement of criminal elements.

In the 1980s, the military was tasked with the interception of overland transportation of drugs across its national borders.

But Mexico’s antiquated legal system was not capable of dealing with a criminal element operating across various states. This is similar to why the FBI was first created in this country; interstate crime required a new type of solution.

In the 1990s, Mexico’s military was engaged with intercepting aircraft incoming from its southern border and intercepting marine craft entering Mexican waters.

These operations signaled a shift from passive and reactive drug interdiction to active interception and destruction missions. But they were still limited by ineffective civilian police forces.

Throughout this time, Mexico was only a transit point between drug cultivation in Colombia, Peru and other South American countries on their way to the U.S.

Few Mexicans were addicted to drugs and the Mexican cartels were nothing more than errand boys for the Colombian cartels. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. actively engaged the Colombian cartels until about 1993, when the Colombian cartels were largely rendered ineffective.

The insatiable American appetite for drugs and disposable money for drug purchases allowed the Mexican errand boys to become the dominant drug dealers on the world stage.

In the case of Colombia, the end result of America’s drug intervention resulted in a Colombian government that has lost control of portions of its national territory where even its military has no jurisdiction, something that Mexicans are fully aware of and are not interested in duplicating in their country.

After 9/11 and as a result of America’s newfound interest in securing its borders, Mexican cartels turned to addicting Mexican youth in order to keep money flowing to their operations. This turned the drug problem from transit to consumption within its borders and a national security problem for the country.

Beginning in 2007, President Felipe Calderón launched initiatives taking the response to the drug problem from a policing action to fundamentally revamping the country’s internal security and judicial apparatus from the ground up.

Not only did the federal government begin to rewrite its antiquated laws and systems to deal with the complex issues of interstate and inter-country criminal organizations, but it directly addresses the problem of corruption ingrained within Mexico’s society.

Corruption in Mexico is a national problem borne from childhood to adulthood. It is a community issue ingrained in the society that needs to be eradicated. The solution to this problem is a fundamental restructuring of the society that will take years, if not generations, to complete.

It requires fundamentally building societal trust in governmental institutions while at the same time changing the way things have been done for centuries in Mexican society.

The internal security problem was easier to solve but still complicated to implement, as it required removing policing duties temporarily while a new police force was created from the ground up.

This is one of two reasons, the other being the cartels fighting national forces, why the security in cities like Juárez deteriorated so quickly. Calderón fired all police forces, local, state and federal and made them reapply and retrain for their positions.

The Mexican military was tasked with policing duties in cities like Juárez. But the military is not trained or equipped to handle intra-country policing and security duties.

Even under this unprecedented pressure upon Mexico’s military forces, for the most part, they have been a credit to the Mexican flag. There have been isolated instances of abuses and friendly fire incidents, the most recent one being in a college in Monterrey. But many of those are part of the cartel’s disinformation campaigns to discredit Mexican institutions.

Another problem is the distorted perception that the Mexican military is unable to defend the nation. During the Easter holiday, Mexico’s military was actively engaged, for the first time in over 10 years, by a coordinated and well-armed militia at multiple locations. The military successfully and effectively defended its positions and did not lose any portion of the Mexican state to the insurgency.

The Mexican military suffered one minor casualty, while the insurgents lost 18 men. This demonstrates the Mexican state’s ability and willingness to maintain control of its national integrity. These are not the actions of a so-called failed state.

At the same time, Mexican institutions have demonstrated that they are capable of acting responsibly and effectively as a country and as a people. The notion that Mexico is a siesta-taking little country needs to be replaced with the reality that it is a contributing member of the global community and the eleventh largest economy in the world.

In terms of what can America do, the fact is that generally, the American government has acted responsibly and decisively with this crisis. The national media, for the most part, sells sensationalism so the American population is ignorant of this reality.

This has led to the misguided movements for legalizing drugs or mobilizing troops to Mexico’s border. To its credit, the Obama administration has respected Mexico’s need for self-determination and acknowledged that the problem is a shared problem that will only be solved through bilateral solutions.

There are three likely ends to the current crisis. The first is to let the cartels dictate the direction the Mexican state is to take. This is simply unacceptable to both the American and the Mexican people.

The second option is a Colombia-like solution where Mexico abdicates portions of its national territory to organized crime. Even if we are to accept the notion that Mexico is willing to sacrifice its sovereignty, the reality is that such a solution would not be palatable to the United States.

There is plenty of land between Colombia and the United States, unlike with Mexico. Although the stated policy of the U.S. is to deal with issues extra-territorially, the fact is that Mexico is on America’s doorstep, so this will violate the principle of fighting the cartels in faroff places. At the same time, Mexico has historically been hypersensitive to loss of national sovereignty.

The third possibility and more likely scenario is for Mexico to make it so difficult for the cartels to operate within Mexico that it forces them to relocate to another country.

There are several signs that this is already in the works, as both Guatemala and Nicaragua have recently complained of Mexican cartel operations within their national borders.

I would also argue that the cartels’ direct engagement of Mexican military forces and increasing violence demonstrates their loss of revenues and operating capability within Mexico.

To those that continue to argue that the Mexican state has been defeated or is supporting one cartel over the others, they ignore the simple fact that the Mexican state is still intact and in control of its sovereignty.

It has not backed down, even after much political and economic pressure to do so. Of course, the perfect solution should be the eradication of the drug cartels, but this is not feasible as long as America’s insatiable appetite for drugs remains and the money to feed it is still there.

And this is where America can play a large part in the solution. America must deal with the problem of drug consumption in its country. As long as there are consumers, there will be money to feed the cartels.

As for what can be done as a community, both the American and Mexican people have to give credit where credit is due: that the Mexican government has been dealing with the problem effectively.

Are there numerous issues that still need to be addressed? Of course. But it must start with us. We need to look well into ourselves and ask ourselves: Are we doing our part by not encouraging or protecting drug habits? Are we doing business with people we know are not part of the problem?

As they say, the ball is now in our court. Are we, as a multinational society, up to the task? The solution is in us, and it begins and ends with us.

Martín Paredes, a business owner in Juárez and El Paso and consultant on U.S.-Mexico geopolitics, can be reached at martinparedes.com.

Supporting Document

El Paso Inc. Article, April 25, 2010: What can be done - Support Document

The El Paso Inc. (April 25, 2010 issue) was kind enough to publish my article on my opinion about what can de done to resolve the murder crisis in Cd. Juárez. Because of space limitations the article did not include the supporting information about Mexican drug interdiction operations. I have reproduced them below for your convenience:

Operaciones Conjuntas con la participación de la Secretaria de la Defensa

1966 EL "PLAN CANADOR" promedio de 3,000 elementos
1977 FUERZA DE TAREA "CÓNDOR" promedio de 3,000 elementos
1987 FUERZA DE TAREA "MARTE" promedio de 3,000 elementos
1996 FUERZA DE TAREA "AZTECA"
1998 OPERACIÓN "GUARDIÁN" en la frontera norte, sur y PENÍNSULA DE YUCATÁN.

Diciembre (December) 2000, DIRECTIVA "AZTECA XXI".

Noviembre (November) 2001, EL PLAN GENERAL CONTRA EL NARCOTRÁFICO "MILENIO".

16 Junio (June) 2004, APLICACIÓN DEL "PLAN ESTRATÉGICO DE COMBATE AL NARCOTRÁFICO DE LA S.D.N.".

"DIRECTIVA PARA EL COMBATE INTEGRAL AL NARCOTRÁFICO 2007-2012"

1986 - 1994, 26,000 elementos en promedio.
1994 - 2000, 28,000 elementos en promedio.
2000 - 2006, 30,000 elementos en promedio.

Comandantes FUERZA DE TAREA CÓNDOR

I. GRAL.DIV.PRCDTA.D.E.M.A. José HERNÁNDEZ Toledo (16-ENE-1977 - 15-SEP-1977)

II. GRAL.BGDA. Roberto HEINE Rangel (16-SEP-1977 - 15-MAR-1978)
GRAL.BGDA. D.E.M. Manuel LOMELÍ Gamboa (16-MAR-1978 - 31-AGO-1978)

III. GRAL.BRIG.D.E.M. Manuel Díaz ESCOBAR Figueroa (01-SEP-1978 - 27-JUN-1979)

IV. GRAL.BGDA.D.E.M. Jesús GÓMEZ Ruiz (28-JUN-1979 - 15-DIC-1979)

V. GRAL.BGDA.D.E.M. Luis BARQUERA Trucios (16-DIC-1979 - 31-MAY-1980)

VI. GRAL.BGDA.D.E.M. José CORTEZ Alfan (01-JUN-1980 - 30-NOV-1980)

VII. COR.INF.D.E.M. Salvador ÁLVAREZ Nahara (01-DIC-1980 - 15-ABR-1981)
COR.INF.D.E.M. Ricardo SOLARES Sánchez (16-ABR-1981 - 31-MAY-1981)

VIII. COR.NF.D.E.M. Ricardo SOLARES Sánchez (01-JUN-1981 - 19-DIC-1981)

IX. COR.INF.D.E.M. Ricardo CAREAGA Eesrambasaguas (20-DIC-1981 - 31-MAY-1982)

X. COR.CAB.D.E.M. Salvador GÓMEZ Resendiz (01-JUN-1982 - 11-NOV-1982)

XI. GRAL.BRIG.D.E.M. Fidel MARTÍNEZ Pineda (12-NOV-1982 - 28-FEB-1983)
GRAL.BRIG.D.E.M. Jaime PALACIOS Guerrero (01-MAR-1983 - 31-MAY-1983)

I-83. GRAL.BRIG. Juan LÓPEZ Ortiz (01-JUN1983 - 17-DIC-1983)

III-82-88. GRAL.BRIG. Salvador GONZÁLEZ Medina (01-DIC-1983 - 28-FEB-1984)
GRAL.BRIG.D.E.M. Mario PÉREZ Alarcón. (01-MAR-1984 - 31-MAY-1984)

IV-82-88. GRAL.BRIG.D.E.M. Agustín VALLEJO Álvarez (01-JUN-1984 - 15-AGO-1984)
GRAL.BRIG.D.E.M. Juan DE DIOS CALLEROS Aviña (16-AGO-1984 - 30-NOV-1984)

V-82-88. GRAL.BRIG.D.E.M. Gregorio GUERRERO Caudillo (19-DIC-1984 - 15-JUN-1985)

VI-82-88. GRAL.BRIG.D.E.M. Tito VALENCIA Ortiz (16-JUN-1985 - 30-NOV-1985)

VII-82-88. GRAL.BRIG.D.E.M. Jorge Isaac VELÁZQUEZ Fuentes (01-DIC-1985 - 30-JUN-1986)

VIII-82-88. GRAL.BGDA.D.E.M. Manuel ÁVILA Pérez (01-JUL-1986 - 31-ENE-1987)

The attached document details Mexican Government Operational results from 1986 to 2007